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Two Levels of Selection 
Some unpleasant emotions, like fear and disgust, appear straightforwardly susceptible to 
evolutionary explanation on account of the benefits they seem to provide to individuals. But guilt 
is more puzzling in this respect. Like other unpleasant emotions, guilt is often associated with a 
host of negative effects on the individual, such as psychological suffering and social withdrawal 
(Harder 1995; Luyten et al. 2002). Moreover, many guilt-induced behaviors, such as revealing 
one’s offenses and placing oneself before the mercy of others, could levy a cost to individuals 
that is not outweighed by guilt’s benefits. Supposing there is an evolutionary story to tell about 
the origins of guilt, the question is how such negative effects were sufficiently outweighed by the 
potential fitness payoffs that guilt might have yielded to individuals. In this article, we consider 
which forms of evolution could have resulted in guilt, and whether current evidence can tell us 
which form of evolution most likely occurred. 
 
There are two forms of evolutionary selection on which we might draw when explaining guilt, 
individual selection and group selection. Individual selection occurs when individuals in a 
population vary from one another with respect to some trait, and some of this variation is fitness-
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affecting and heritable. The traits in this case are individual-level traits, and the selection occurs 
within groups or populations of individuals, leading to increased frequency of some traits and a 
decrease of others within the populations. Much of evolution occurs in this way.  
 
But there is also a form of evolution that operates at a group level. The idea here is that groups of 
individuals exhibit traits and can fare better or worse than other groups because of these traits. 
Although groups and their individual members can sometimes exhibit the same property (e.g., a 
group of wildebeest might be fast when all or most of its members are fast), groups frequently 
exhibit traits no individual organism can bear, such as sex ratio (the proportion of males and 
females).  Things get interesting when a trait is selected against at the individual level, but 
selected for at the group level. Such a trait benefits the group and helps it prosper, even though it 
is not in the evolutionary interest of individuals to bear it. 
 
One such trait with these characteristics may be biologically altruistic behavior. In this case, it 
might not on balance be biologically advantageous for individual organisms to exhibit 
biologically altruistic behavior, but it might be biologically advantageous for the group to be 
composed of altruistic individuals. If the group-level selection pressure is strong enough, the 
altruistic trait can spread throughout the species in spite of its individually-maladaptive 
character. This is the conclusion reached by Darwin in his (1871) Descent of Man when he 
argued that brave warriors could evolve because warring groups with brave warriors will 
conquer groups without—or with fewer—brave warriors, even if there is an individual-level 
fitness cost to being brave. Contemporary work on altruism draws similar conclusions with 
respect to strong group-level selection (Sober and Wilson 1998). 
 
Group selection, however, has a fraught history, with some challenging the tenability of selection 
at a level higher than that of genes or individuals (see Okasha (2006) for a general overview of 
this debate). But the consensus position today among biologists and philosophers of biology is 
that group selection does occur; the main debate concerns how strong a force it is in nature. For 
our purposes here, we need only assume that group selection explanations can be tenable.  
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Returning to the subject of guilt, our main question here is whether guilt is likely to have been 
selected for at the individual level, at the group level, or both. Might it be individually 
advantageous to be guilt prone? Or is guilt proneness similar to a biologically altruistic trait in 
that it might be biologically disadvantageous for individuals, but good for the group? 
 
One way to advance an answer to this question is through the use of evolutionary game theory. 
On the evolutionary game theoretical approach, the conditions and strategies for interaction 
among players are pre-specified as elements of a mathematical model. On the basis of this 
model, determinate conclusions can be reached with respect to the evolvability of a particular 
behavioral trait among the players. O’Connor (2016) and Rosenstock and O’Connor (this issue 
of Emotion Researcher) utilize this approach to determine under what specifiable conditions 
guilt could evolve at the individual level.  
 
Our explanatory approach here, however, diverges from the game theoretical approach. Rather 
than specify the conditions under which guilt could evolve at the individual or group level, we 
begin by querying the clinical, empirical, and legal literatures on guilt in order to arrive an 
adequate understanding of guilt’s motivational profile and the role it plays in human 
interpersonal contexts. We then consider what can be inferred about the evolutionary function of 
guilt and whether guilt was favored at the individual level or the group level. Our approach 
should not be seen standing in opposition to the game theoretical approach; rather, each approach 
should be viewed as a potential complement to the other. 
 
The Nature of Guilt 
Subjects of clinical and empirical studies frequently identify the object of their guilt experiences 
as a specifiable set of past actions that deviated from or violated accepted social or moral 
standards, and for which they take responsibility (Barrett, 1995; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & 
Zinner, 2007; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). The link between guilt experiences 
and the judgment that one is responsible for such transgressions underwrites the conception of 
guilt as primarily action-focused, that is to say, the object or focus of guilt tends to be particular 
actions or behaviors that an individual identifies as her/his own. This contrasts with the self-
focused character of other painful emotions, such as shame and embarrassment, where the 
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emotion is directed toward the whole self or a negatively perceived aspect of the self (Barrett, 
1995; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barrow, 1996).  
 
Guilt thus centers on actions – manifesting as an unpleasant feeling associated with past 
wrongful actions or the contemplation of anticipated future wrongdoing. Because we wish to 
know whether guilt was favored by individual-level or group-level selection, we need to 
understand what the effects of guilt-induced behavior are on the individual who performs them. 
We can consider these effects within contemporary human social contexts, which could help us 
to understand why guilt evolved in humans.  
 
Of course, the current adaptive effects of guilt will be imperfect indicators of guilt’s origin, but 
they can suggest hypotheses about past evolutionary pressures. It is also helpful to know whether 
guilt is more phylogenetically widespread, as this might provide us with some clues about how 
evolutionarily ancient guilt is. As we shall see, this may help us decide between individual and 
group level models of selection. Let us begin by considering some recent examples of individual-
level selection models.    
 
Individual-Level Selection and Guilt 
Two approaches to developing an individual-level account of guilt have been especially popular. 
One account involves focusing on the way guilt functions as an emotionally painful check on 
motivations to violate normative standards. Joyce (2006) and James (2011) take this approach, 
developing what might be called ‘self-recrimination’ models of guilt. On their view, the 
experience of guilt functions as a sort of self-punishment for individuals who transgress social 
norms, and its anticipation can thus dampen motivations to defect or cheat on cooperative 
ventures governed by such norms. Guilt, then, reinforces cooperative tendencies in individuals, 
which, on Joyce’s and James’s view, explains why it was favored by selection at the individual 
level. 
 
A second common approach to explaining guilt explores how guilt might have solved particular 
problems individuals faced in organizing and sustaining cooperative arrangements. Frank’s 
(1988) commitment model of the social emotions is perhaps the most familiar and influential of 
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such accounts. On Frank’s model, individual selection favored social emotions, including guilt, 
that enabled individuals to make credible commitments to one another in the organization and 
execution of cooperative ventures.  
 
He suggests two pathways by which the social emotions would have evolved. First, those who 
experienced social emotions like guilt would have been disposed to maintain their commitments 
to cooperative ventures, and would thereby earn positive reputations for having such dispositions 
and for being reliable partners. Second, guilt and other social emotions are associated with hard-
to-fake, largely involuntary facial and physiological expressions. These expressions serve as 
reliable indicators that an individual experiences social and moral emotions, from which others 
can infer that the individual is disposed to keep to the terms of cooperative agreements. Along 
either pathway, the community’s preference for individuals who are reliable cooperators and the 
community’s ability to discern who those cooperators are would have increased the selective 
pressure on the emotions that disposed individuals to cooperate. 
 
Self-recrimination and commitment models of guilt highlight important roles guilt plays in the 
social life of individuals. However, these models leave unexplained important aspects of guilt 
and guilt-induced behavior. First, guilt is associated clinically and empirically with a number of 
psychologically maladaptive effects (Bybee & Quiles, 1998; Harder, 1995; Lindsay-Hartz, de 
Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Luyten, Fontaine, & Corveleyn, 2002), and it induces a number of 
behaviors that could be costly to the individual, including confession to violations of social 
norms, acceptance of external punishment, and self-penance (Katchadourian 2010; Radzik 
2009).  Moreover, there is evidence that psychopaths, who are thought either to have an 
attenuated capacity for guilt or to lack that capacity altogether, are more successful at obtaining 
conditional release from prison sentences (Porter et al., 2009), despite psychopathy being a 
reliable predictor of recidivism (Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008). This is likely due 
to the fact that they can be more strategic in their appeals because they do not have guilty 
feelings encroaching on their behavior (Porter et al., 2009). Thus, the putative cost of guilt on 
individuals may not be limited to the degree of emotional pain one experiences, but may also 
include behaviors that guilt prompts.   
 
This	is	a	preprint	of	an	article	whose	final	and	definitive	form	is	published	in	Emotion	Researcher:	
http://emotionresearcher.com/the-evolutionary-puzzle-of-guilt-individual-or-group-selection/	
	
6	
Second, the focus on guilt’s role as a painful psychological counterweight to motivations to 
defect on or cheat cooperative ventures does not explain why selective pressures targeted guilt 
proneness. Recent empirical research in developmental psychology and neuroscience suggest 
that guilt is costly in terms of the psychological hardware that underwrites it. Developmentally, 
guilt emerges late in children, concurrent with or after the emergence of capacities to take 
responsibility for particular actions, to evaluate those actions by normative standards, and to 
experience empathic concern for others (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis 1997; Harris 1989; 
Kochanska et al. 2002; Lagattuta &Thompson 2007). Neuroimaging has shown that experiences 
of guilt are associated with reduced asymmetry between left- and right-cortical activity, which 
suggests that guilt experiences involve both withdrawal and approach orientations, motivating 
complex behavioral sequences involving self-regulation and reparation (Amodio, Devine, & 
Harmon-Jones 2007). This asymmetry does not appear to obtain during reported experiences of 
other negative, other-directed emotions (ibid.). While much more can be said with respect to the 
developmental and cognitive complexity of guilt – for further discussion, see Deem & Ramsey 
(2016), Section 3 – enough has been said to see that the self-recrimination and commitment 
models must answer the question of why selection might favor such complexity just to reinforce 
or augment other, more phylogenetically ancient emotions that already undergird prosocial 
behavior. Neither model provides a satisfactory answer to this question, leaving the evolutionary 
puzzle of guilt unsolved.    
 
Guilt in the Legal Arena 
Another area of research in which we can find clues for solving the evolutionary puzzle of guilt 
is the study of guilt in the legal arena. Although the modern legal system is, from an evolutionary 
time scale, a recent invention, norms and norm violations are much older. By seeing how guilt 
operates within the current legal milieu, we can cautiously extrapolate to what the consequences 
of guilt may have been during its evolutionary origin. This will serve as another source of 
evidence for whether we should take guilt to be good for individuals or bad at the individual 
level, but good for groups. 
 
The term guilty has a dual meaning; it can refer to the fact of having committed a crime (one can 
be “guilty of a crime” without any negative feelings about it), or it can refer to the emotion (one 
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can feel guilty about a state of affairs). It is thus important not to conflate these two senses. To be 
as clear as possible, we will only use the word ‘guilt’ to refer to the emotion and will therefore 
use phrases like ‘committed the crime’ instead of ‘guilty of the crime’. 
 
With mock trials, it is clear that displays of guilt help convince jurors that a defendant committed 
the crime (Jehle, Miller, & Kemmelmeier, 2009), especially if guilt is expressed shortly after the 
crime (Bornstein, Rung, & Miller, 2002). This shows the dangers of displaying guilt after 
suspected involvement in a crime.  
 
Although displays of guilt can increase the chance of conviction, it generally has an opposite 
effect on sentencing (Gold & Weiner, 2000; Robinson, Smith-Lovin, & Tsoudis, 1994). Thus, 
once someone is convicted, if they have not displayed signs of guilt, they will generally receive a 
harsher punishment (Garvey, 1998). Such individuals are described as “cold-blooded” and are 
despised for their lack of emotion. This therefore poses a dilemma for those convicted: 
displaying guilt makes one more likely to be convicted, but if convicted without displaying guilt, 
a more severe punishment is likely.  
 
Whether or not guilt is good for the convicted individual in such situations will therefore depend 
on the degree to which a display of guilt increases conviction probabilities and mitigates 
punishment. Furthermore, the weight of evidence will play a role in whether it is good or bad to 
exhibit guilt. If the defendant was caught red-handed, then guilt displays will do little to increase 
their chance of conviction and will generally be a good thing. But if there is little evidence, guilt 
will have a stronger negative effect on the accused. 
 
In studies of actual court cases, displays of guilt are often linked to mitigated punishments. This 
is especially true of first-time offenders and those who committed less severe crimes (Harrel, 
1981; Eisenberg, Garvey, & Wells, 1998). But why, we should ask, are we inclined to be lenient 
toward those who display guilt? One possible reason is that experiencing guilt is perceived by 
others as form of self-punishment, and the more that guilt is experienced, the less externally 
imposed punishment seems warranted. Another reason may be that those who experience intense 
guilt will not want to repeat the experience and will thus be less likely to recidivate. While it is 
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clear that guilt can serve as a form of punishment in its own right, is it the case that those who 
are more guilt prone are less likely to recidivate? Some studies show that genuine guilt feelings 
do indeed predict lower recidivation rates (Hosser, Windzio, & Greve, 2008). 
 
More generally, guilt-prone individuals exhibit fewer offenses and less delinquent behavior 
(Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2012). They tend to be more 
prosocial, compliant, altruistic, and are more apt to perform reparative behaviors (Malti & 
Krettenauer, 2013; Silfver, 2007; Regan, 1971; Carlsmith & Gross, 1969). Guilt-prone 
individuals also tend to be recognized by themselves and others as better leaders – they more 
frequently are chosen or volunteer for leadership positions (Schaumberg & Flynn, 2012). 
 
Evolutionary Scenarios for the Emergence of Guilt: Too Early To Tell? 
Does the evidence presented above point us toward an individual or group selection account of 
guilt? Intuitively, evidence that guilt-prone individuals exhibit less delinquent and more 
cooperative behavior, and that they are more apt to offer themselves for – and to be selected for – 
leadership positions supports both individual and group-level accounts. Being less 
counterproductive will tend to be good for individual actors and will tend to make for efficient 
groups. Assuming that being a leader is advantageous to the individual, and that groups tend to 
benefit from having guilt-prone leaders, this aspect of guilt proneness is clearly adaptive for 
individuals and groups.  
 
Other consequences of guilt proneness, on the other hand, have fairly obvious benefits for the 
groups to which the individuals belong, but it is less certain that they are advantageous for the 
individual. For example, we have seen that manifesting guilt in legal trials can both help and 
hinder defendants. We also noted that the psychological discomfort of guilt experiences and the 
reparative and confessional behaviors that guilt motivates increase the chance that one’s 
transgressions will be discovered. 
 
 Finally, while it is good for group harmony to have individuals deterred from committing 
offenses, it may be better for individuals to lack a general deterrence from committing offenses 
so that they can strategically commit them when there will be no or little repercussion. While 
This	is	a	preprint	of	an	article	whose	final	and	definitive	form	is	published	in	Emotion	Researcher:	
http://emotionresearcher.com/the-evolutionary-puzzle-of-guilt-individual-or-group-selection/	
	
9	
these situations do not directly point to a group selection scenario for guilt, they present 
difficulties for individual-level accounts of guilt. At the very least, this suggests we should 
remain open to group selection models. 
 
To sum up, the main accounts of the origin of guilt, like those of Joyce (2006), James (2011), 
and Frank (1988), focus on showing how guilt can be good for the individual. Although some 
aspects of guilt proneness seem to support an individual-level selection account of guilt, we’ve 
seen that some key features of guilt proneness may well be maladaptive for individuals. What we 
would like to conclude here is that we should take the group selection scenario seriously. We 
should not simply assume that guilt is individually adaptive, and that the sole task of giving an 
evolutionary account is to show how this is possible.  
 
If we are right that we should take the group-level account seriously, how, then, might we decide 
between them? First of all, we should not think that the evolutionary story has to be one of either 
group or individual selection. It is quite possible that both levels of selection operated on guilt, 
and both promoted its evolution.  
 
Evidence on the timing of the emergence of guilt can help us decide which evolutionary scenario 
is the most probable. The reason for this is that if guilt emerged preceding the origin of complex 
communication and cognitive abilities like reputation tracking, then bad reputations would not 
have been a negative factor for individuals. Individuals could take advantage of others without 
fear of eroding their reputation, and thus guilt would be a hindrance for individuals. In the 
absence of social traits like reputation, however, guilt proneness remains good at the group level: 
groups filled with individuals taking advantage of one another will not flourish and produce 
more groups than groups lacking such individuals. This is nothing more than Darwin’s (1871) 
insight about brave warriors discussed above.  
 
A key source of information about the timing of the origins of guilt is the literature on whether 
nonhuman primates or other mammals exhibit guilt. If guilt is widespread, then this points to an 
early origin. Some primatologists and anthropologists contend that there is evidence that 
nonhuman primates are capable of experiencing at least a proto-form of guilt. For example, de 
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Waal (1996) suggests that some nonhuman primates are capable of internalizing social rules, and 
that the submission behaviors that subordinates perform before dominant conspecifics after 
violating those rules may be evidence of the phylogenetic starting point of guilt. A well-known 
example of such behaviors is exhibited in Coe and Rosenblum’s (1984) study of mating 
behaviors of male macaques. Subordinate males exhibited mating behaviors toward females in 
the absence of the dominant male, but would later perform submission behaviors when the latter 
returned. Similarly, Fessler and Gervais (2010) suggest that a guilt-like mechanism might best 
explain the reconciliation behaviors exhibited among nonhuman primates after intragroup 
conflicts.  
 
Other researchers, however, are not confident that such submission and reconciliation behaviors 
constitute evidence of guilt in other primates. Drawing from his extensive fieldwork with 
chimpanzees in Gombe, Boehm (2012) contends that these behaviors are better explained in 
terms of fear of discovery and punishment subsequent to violation of social rules. 
 
The current primatological data, then, appear inconclusive with respect to determining whether 
guilt or proto-guilt is present in nonhuman primates. Thus, in contrast to Joyce (2006), who 
maintains that there is no evidence of guilt in nonhuman primates, we keep open the possibility 
that guilt has a deeper phylogenetic origin than the hominin lineage.   
 
This leads us to offer a provisional conclusion on the individual-level or group-level origins of 
guilt. We can frame this in terms of a pair of conditionals: If it turns out that guilt has a deep 
evolutionary history, then it likely evolved via group selection. If, on the other hand, guilt 
emerged relatively recently within our lineage, then the individual-selection account is tenable. 
This conclusion points to the central importance of data on the timing of the origin of guilt, and 
suggests how these data should lead us to favor one evolutionary scenario over another. Let’s 
now consider how we can we move beyond these conditionals, and get closer to finding a 
solution to the evolutionary puzzle of guilt. 
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Future Directions in Research on the Evolution of Guilt 
We have seen that the timing of the origins of guilt are of central importance to resolving the 
question of how guilt evolved. One vital area of research will involve work on how to identify 
guilt in nonhuman animals. How can we move beyond behaviors associated with guilt – such as 
the avoidance of future punishment – to identify the emotion of guilt in particular? This might 
involve reinterpreting existing behavioral data, generating new data, and further developing 
criteria for distinguishing genuine expressions of guilt. 
 
In addition to further work on the identification of guilt, more work is needed in fleshing out and 
modeling evolutionary scenarios. For example, how strong could the group-selection pressure 
have been? If it is proposed as the primary factor underlying the emergence of the emotion, 
could it have been a sufficient cause of the emergence and maintenance of the emotion? What 
models of individual selection are capable of selecting for guilt proneness? And how much 
cognitive sophistication is really needed for guilt proneness to be individually adaptive? 
 
Raising these important questions here helps to show what is needed in order to establish a clear 
evolutionary picture of guilt. The difficult task of answering them, we suspect, will require more 
collaboration and fruitful interchange between philosophers, biologists, and psychologists. 
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